

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
2003
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SECURITY INFORMATION

1 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Deputy to CWH, Project PESUCCESS
SUBJECT : Personnel--Guatemala

Present Personnel

New and Proposed New Personnel

2. [] has already been transferred from [] to Guatemala and [] is in the process of [] and is to be assigned to Guatemala.

3. With the additional new officer personnel and the additional proposed new covert personnel as outlined below, the Station will be in dire need of the services of a competent clerk-stenographer, GS-5. To avoid delay in [] this clerk-stenographer should be one presently []

4. In addition to the above, the Station is in need of the services of [] whose status and future services

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in connection with this Project has been a matter of discussion at Headquarters, or the Station needs a replacement for him. In the event that adequate [] not established for him, it is my considered opinion that it is absolutely necessary that he depart Guatemala prior to February, 1954, when his present [] will expire. As mentioned to you and to Colonel King, the cover of this [] is very weak by reason of two years' assignment and his continued presence and handling of our operations there constitute a danger both to himself and to our operations. In the event he is replaced, the person replacing him should be an experienced [] who will engage himself primarily in the handling of ESSENCE. The handling of ESSENCE will practically be a full time job, but he will in addition act as an observer, picking up what he can in a cover capacity [] He should preferably be single and speak good Spanish. ESSENCE does not speak English. If not single, he should either leave his wife in the United States or she should be security-cleared and be a person who would contribute to his [] rather than endanger it. A single man attracts attention, becomes the object of suspicions, whereas a wife, if the proper kind, could serve to divert the normal suspicions. Improving language ability, [] and the economic development of the country would be the best line for this possible replacement of HEDIGER. He would travel to Guatemala on a tourist card, which preferably should be obtained from a Guatemalan Consulate fairly distant from Washington, D. C.

5. The Station should have one new experienced FI staff agent in a covert capacity [] [] travel [] and conform at least in a general way to the qualifications as outlined above for the possible replacement of HEDIGER. This [] could act as direct supervisor of ESCROW, who has an extensive number of contacts in high government Spanish-Communist and Spanish-Republican circles. HEDIGER is now acting as [] with ESCROW but ESCROW needs direct supervision rather than supervision by means of written communications as is the case at present. This new [] would have the principal task of Communist Party and high government penetration not only through ESCROW but also by the development of new sources. In the event it is not found possible to acquire the services of this proposed new FI [] as an alternative we will have to use as supervisor of ESCROW, [] but [] use would entail an additional security problem because of the difficulty of making the street contacts with ESCROW who is well known in government circles and any observation of him in contact with American Embassy officials would immediately blow him. HEDIGER also presently handles [] a

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[] Exiled, who is in the operational development stage and who is referred to locally and signs receipts for payments as [] The development of [] has been for the purpose of penetrating the labor movement and he has prepared an extensive study for us of the entire labor movement in Guatemala, including unions, federations, confederations, and organizational status, Communist influence, etc. [] [] and has [] mentality. He has done considerable work in the past with the more middle-of-the-road element of the Partido de la Revolucion Guatemalteco, pro-government political party which is infiltrated with Communists at high level. His efforts have been to indoctrinate labor elements of that party with a middle-of-the-road rather than an extreme leftist-Communist thinking. His recommendations, being the last portion of this extensive study he prepared, contain some good points from the long range point of view but obviously his ideas will not conform to the urgent concept with which we view the situation. For that reason if we continue to use [] I am inclined to feel that he has more value to us as an FI agent furnishing us information which he may acquire through his extensive contacts in labor circles. His information will be of value from a psychological point of view to afford us guidance. There have been indications that he has contacts among the Communist element at lower levels, but the high level, hard core Communists despise him and activity on his part lays him open to attack by them and a propagandizing of his status as an exile in the country. If we continue to use him, he will have to be supervised by the proposed new FI [] or [] the same as in the case of ESCROW. []

6. As a result of my conversations with you regarding the overall program and particularly as to communications required to meet our necessities, I strongly recommend that we have an additional communications officer capable of handling portable radio equipment in an undercover capacity outside of the Embassy. It is my view that he will have to acquire a house within the city and from that house portable equipment will be employed to handle all traffic between Lincoln and Guatemala. Since he will need a house from which to operate, no apartment space in Guatemala City being suitable, it will be necessary for cover purposes that his wife accompany him (no children) and that she be security-cleared. It is not difficult to obtain houses for temporary periods of from three to six months at the present time. He can ostensibly

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7. The three above-mentioned proposed new agents should be allowed to exceed, at our expense, the quarters allowances to which they are entitled under existing regulations provided it is determined by the Chief of Station that the obtaining of the specific quarters selected by each would result in a direct advantage to the government by reason of placing each of them in a position to carry out his mission in a secure manner and provided that other suitable quarters are not available. It is impossible to anticipate that such circumstances will arise but I believe that it is important that the Chief of Station be in a position to authorize such expenditures over the allowance rate which they are entitled in order to meet any contingencies which might arise.

Orig & 1: Addressee
cc: Chief of Station, Guatemala

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